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DAMAGES
I. PMsoNAL IW JuRY
A. Future Medical Expenses
In Kelly v. Brazell 1 the plaintiff sued to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision with
the defendant. The trial resulted in a general verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal the defendant contended that the trial
judge's instructions allowing an award for future medical
expenses were not warranted by the evidence. The only evi-
dence pertaining to future medical expenses was the plaintiff's
doctor's testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had suffered
a mild but permanent disability of five percent and would
require certain medication from time to time for the allevia-
tion of pain. No evidence was given concerning the amount or
the cost of such medication.
In affirming the award, the court stated:
We think that the evidence as a whole warrants an
inference that some future medical expense would
most probably be incurred by this plaintiff ....
It must be conceded that there is perhaps a mini-
mum of certainty as to the amount of medical ex-
pense which might be required in the future, and it
would have been helpful to the jury if estimates rel-
ative to the amount of medication and the cost thereof
had been included. At the same time this court ap-
preciates the fact that estimates might have been
difficult.2
As in a majority of jurisdictions,3 early South Carolina case
law established that a party could recover future medical
expenses, but only those reasonably certain to be incurred as
a proximate result of the wrongful act.4 The reason for re-
quiring such certainty was the danger of a verdict based
1. 253 S.C. 564, 172 SYE.2d 304 (1970).
2. Id. at 567, 172 S.E2d at 305.
3. 15 Am. Jun. 21) Damages § 139 (1964).
4. The leading South Carolina case to this effect is Green v. Catawba
Power Co., 75 S.C. 102, 55 S.E. 125 (1906), where the court held that an
injured party is not entitled to recover damages for expenses which may or
may not be incurred in the future. See also Brewer v. Northwestern R.R.,
151 S.C. 415, 149 SE. 124 (1929); Lockhart Power Co. v. Askew, 110 S.C.
449, 96 S.E. 685 (1918).
1
Herlong: Damages
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH OAxioLiNA LAW REviEw
solely on speculation. The general trend, however, as reflected
by Kelly, is to allow the question to go to the jury rather than
to deprive the plaintiff of any possibility of recovery.5
B. Punitive Damages
The practice of awarding punitive damages, thus effecting
a punishment upon the defendant, is of comparatively recent
origin, as it departs from the traditional notion that damages
are awarded only for the purpose of making the injured party
whole.0 In Turner v. Sinclair Refining Co.7 the defendant was
assessed punitive as well as compensatory damages for his
negligence in maintaining a dangerous loading platform. The
platform, used for loading oil tankers, was not high enough
to permit the drivers to park their tankers partially beneath
it. Thus, in order to load, the driver had to swing by a rope
for a distance of several feet from the platform to the top of
the tanker. In addition, oil had accumulated on the deck of
the platform because of inadequate drainage. The plaintiff
was injured when he slipped on the oil and fell as he at-
tempted to swing over onto his tanker. At the trial the de-
fendant's agent admitted that the platform would have been
safer if higher and that the oil might have seeped through the
drainage plates, though he did not know that it had done so.
On appeal the defendant argued that such testimony was
not sufficient evidence of willfulness to support a verdict for
punitive damages. The court, in rejecting the defendant's
contention, stated:
It is clearly inferable that appellant had full knowl-
edge of not only the obvious perils, but the latent
peril. Willfulness is the conscious failure to use due
care ... there was abundant evidence here of con-
scious failure on the part of the appellant to exercise
due care for the safety of the various drivers . .. .
While not resolving any new points of law, the court in
Turner clarified established law which has caused much con-
fusion, not only in South Carolina but also in many other
jurisdictions.9 In South Carolina it was early established that,
5. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 91(3) (1966).
6. Shuler v. Heitley, 209 S.C. 198, 39 S.E2d 360 (1946); C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
7. 254 S.C. 36, 173 S.E2d 356 (1970).
8. Id. at 44, 173 S.E2d at 360 (emphasis added).
9. For a review of other jurisdictions, see 25 C.J.S. Damages § 123 (1966).
[Vol. 2'2
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in order to recover punitive damages, it was unnecessary to
show that the defendant's act was done intentionally with the
express purpose of harming the plaintiff.10 The court's use
of the language such as "willful tort"'" or "actionable will-
fulness"'12 led, however, to seemingly conflicting decisions. It
now seems clear that the key to the recovery of punitive dam-
ages is the defendant's "conscious wrongdoing" which creates
the hazardous condition without regard to his willfulness or
intent to harm the plaintiff. It does not appear necessary to
show that the defendant had actual knowledge, but rather, in
accord with the standard of the reasonable man, that he
should have been aware of the danger created.' 3 The court
will not, however, hold the defendant to the same standard
of care in every case, but will proceed on a case by case
analysis and will look at the relationship of the parties and
the duties owed by each.14
C. Landlord and Tenant
In Sheppard v. Nienow"' an infant, by her mother as
guardian ad item, brought an action against the defendant
landlord to recover damages for personal injury. During the
night the mother, carrying the child, was returning to her
rented trailer and tripped over a metal stake in the yard, the
result of which was an injury to the child. The cause of action
was based upon negligence. The complaint alleged that the
defendant had promised to replace the burned out yard light
and to remove the stakes, that he had not done as he had
promised, and that his failure to do so was the proximate
cause of the child's injury.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff for actual and punitive damages. The supreme court,
reversing, followed the well established precedent'0 that a
10. Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 179 S.C. 367, 184 S.E. 164
(1936) ; Thomasson v. Southern Ry., 72 S.C. 1, 51 S.E. 443 (1905).
11. Dobson v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 79 S.C. 429, 60 S.E. 948 (1908).
12. Hallman v. Cushman, 196 S.C. 402, 13 S.E2d 498 (1941).
13. Note that in Turner it was only "inferable" that the defendant had
knowledge of the danger. Accord, Hinson v. A.T. Sistare Const. Co., 236
S.C. 125, 113 S.E.2d 341 (1960).
14. Eaddy v. Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Lines, Inc., 191 S.C. 538, 5
S.E.2d 281 (1939). In Turner the plaintiff was considered a business invitee.
15. 254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E2d 343 (1970).
16. E.g., Connor v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d
385 (1963); Pendarvis v. Wannamaker, 173 S.C. 299, 175 S.E. 531 (1934);
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breach of a promise by a landlord to make repairs gives rise
merely to a right of action for breach of contract. 17 An action
ex contractu has several disadvantages, the more noteable be-
ing an award limited to the cost of repair or the loss of the
rental value of the property.' 8
An increasing number of jurisdictions find the necessary
duty to repair arising by operation of law out of the con-
tractual relationship, hold the landlord liable in tort, and
award the injured tenant both actual and punitive damages.' 9
This view has found support in the Restatement of Torts"
in which it is clearly stated that the landlord's duty, although
founded upon contract, is not merely contractual, but is also
a duty grounded in tort.21 The Restatement reasons that as a
result of the contractual relationship the lessee is induced to
forego efforts to remedy the dangerous condition2 2; thus, the
landlord's failure to repair becomes the legal cause of the
tenant's injury.
In Sheppard the court noted that the tenant has a number
of options in the event of the landlord's failure to repair:
(1) [R]escind the contract and abandon the premises;
(2) make the repairs himself and deduct the expense
thereof from the rent or recover the same upon a
counterclaim in an action for rent; (3) occupy with-
out repair, and recoup such damages as are ordinarily
incident to a breach of contract by a counterclaim in
the landlord's action for rent; or (4) sue for damages
for breach of contract.23
Certainly, none of these options are adequate after an injury
occurs, as the result in Sheppard clearly indicates. And what
17. Recovery for personal injury is denied as such a result is deemed not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the con-
tract. Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E.
329 (1932).
18. E.g., Leavitt v. Twin County Rental Co., 222 N.C. 81, 21 S.E.2d 890
(1942).
19. See Dean, v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); Williams
v. Davis, 188 Kan. 385, 362 P.2d 641 (1961); Merchants' Cotton Press and
Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 357 (1965). •
21. Comment 4c to the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965),
plainly provides: "The lessor's duty ... is not merely contractual, although
it is founded upon a contract. It is a tort duty. It extends to persons on the
land with the consent of the lessee, with whom the lessor has made no contract."
22. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment 2 (1965).
23. 254 S.C. 44, 49, 173 S.E2d 343, 345, quoting from Timmons v. Williams
Wood Products Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 367, 162 S.E. 329, 331 (1932).
[Vol. 22
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option is there for an indigent tenant who cannot afford to
repair, appear in court, or abandon the premises for lack of
a better place to go? It has been said of a rule similar to that
of South Carolina's: "More may be said of the logical
exactness of this doctrine than of its inherent justice."2 4
D. Instructions to the Jury
In Phillips v. K-Mar 25 the plaintiff sought to recover
damages for injuries sustained as a result of her fall in the
defendant's store. During the trial the plaintiff testified that,
following the accident, she had to hire a maid to help with the
housework. Her testimony was conflicting as to the length of
time during which the maid was employed, and it was not
shown how much the maid was actually paid. The defendant
requested that the trial judge charge the jury that an award
could not be made for the maid expense on the ground that
any such award would be based on mere speculation. The
trial judge failed so to charge, and the jury returned a gen-
eral verdict for the plaintiff.
On appeal the supreme court reversed, finding the trial
judge's omission erroneous and prejudicial. While it is estab-
lished that a judge is not required to charge a jury using the
exact language of the request,26 the charge in the present case
made no reference to the maid expense, nor did it specifically
limit the jury to the areas warranted by the evidence.27 The
court's decision is in accord with the accepted rule that, while
such expense may be recovered, the amount will not be pre-
sumed nor will the jury be allowed to speculate thereon.28
E. Evidence
Young v. Martin2 9 concerned a plaintiff who was involved
in two automobile collisions, one occurring on October 25, 1967,
and the other on December 14, 1967. At the time of the trial
the plaintiff had received compensation from the defendant
involved in the first collision for injuries identical to those
24. Merchants' Cotton Press and Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 188,
186 S.W. 87, 88 (1916).
25. 173 S.E2d 916 (S.C. 1970).
26. Wade v. Columbia Elec. St.-ky., Light and Power Co., 51 S.C. 296, 29
S.E. 233 (1898).
27. The court also noted that the record did not indicate that the plaintiff
had actually incurred any expense for which she, as opposed to her husband,
was entitled to recover.
28. 25A C.J.S. Damages § 144 (1966).




Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH CAROLiNA LAw REVmw
alleged in the instant case. The plaintiff denied this under
oath. The defendant attempted to rebut this denial using
testimony by the attorney representing the previous defen-
dant, medical information introduced by the plaintiff in the
first suit, and the plaintiff's prior complaint (which alleged
identical injuries). The trial judge sustained the plaintiff's
objection to such evidence on the ground that it was irrele-
vant and prejudicial.
The supreme court granted a new trial. The court thus
followed Jackson v. Banks Construction Co.,80 a case involving
similar facts, where the court held that the defendant was
entitled to show the full nature and extent of the injuries
received by the plaintiff in the prior accident.3 ' The present
case, however, went further than Jackson: the court allowed
the defendant to show the amount of the settlement received
as a result of the first collision. The court noted that, al-
though this was not the normal practice, it was proper in light
of the facts and circumstances that developed during the
course of the trial.
3 2
F. Survival and Wrongful Death Statutes
In Griffin v. Planters Chemical (orp. a3 the plaintiff, widow
of the deceased, brought an action to recover damages for
injuries suffered by the deceased before his death and for his
wrongful death. Plaintiff's intestate was twenty-eight years
old, was the father of three children, and was earning an
annual salary of $7,000.00 at the time of his death. The de-
fendant pesticide manufacturer was found negligent in that
it failed to provide proper warning of the highly toxic effects
of parathion dust, a product which it manufactured, which
absorbed into the body of the deceased and caused his death.
30. 229 S.C. 461, 93 S.E2d 604 (1956). See also Mullinax v. Great AtI.
and Pac. Tea Co., 221 S.C. 433, 70 S.F2d 911 (1952).
31. While largely within the discretion of the trial court, the majority of
jurisdictions have allowed the introduction of such evidence. E.g., Bentley v.
Ayers, 102 Ga. App. 733, 117 S.E2d 6331 (1960); Burlington Hotel Corp. v.
Dixon, 196 N.C. 265, 145 S.E. 244 (1928).
32. Although the court did not specifically enumerate the particular facts
and circumstances that prompted this facet of the decision, the amount
received would be relevant on retrial as the jury would have to determine
the extent of the injuries received in each accident and award damages
accordingly; this is in accord with the theory that the plaintiff should not be
made more than whole.
33. 302 F. Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1969).
[Vol. 22
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss4/4
DAmAGES SURVEYED
The court awarded the plaintiff $2,000.00 for the deceased's
pain and suffering as provided for by the Survival Statute.3 4
As compensation for the wrongful death3 5 the plaintiff was
awarded $77,220.00 for pecuniary loss based on the deceased's
expected contribution to the plaintiff and the children; this
award was based on the decedent's work life expectancy.
Although the deceased had a remaining life expectancy of 38
years, the court recognized that because of current retirement
plans he would not have worked this entire time.3 6 The plain-
tiff was also awarded $20,000.00 for loss of companionship
and $10,000.00 for her mental shock and suffering.
II. EMMENT DomAin
In South Carolina Highway Department v. SMithT the
court was faced with a question of novel impression: Is a
landowner entitled to compensation for depreciation in the
value of business equipment which has become useless to him
as a result of condemnation proceedings against his land?
The plaintiff operated a grocery store-filling station on the
condemned property. The store contained the normal items of
equipment, i.e., meat case, scale, meat slicer, cash register, etc.
The plaintiff maintained that, as there was no ready market
for such equipment, it had become a liability for which she
was entitled to compensation. The trial judge instructed the
jury that, if depreciation was found, compensation could be
awarded.
In a three-to-two decision the supreme court reversed. A
majority of the court reasoned that, as the property was not
attached to the land, it could not be classified as a fixture
and that it was not, therefore, included in the "taking". (In
fact the property had been removed by the plaintiff prior to
the condemnation.) The court thus sided with the clear weight
34. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10-209 (1962) provides in part:
Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and
trespasses to and upon real estate and any and all injuries to the
person or to personal property shall survive both to and against the
personal or real representative. . . of a deceased person ....
The deceased suffered from the effects of the poison for approimately two
hours before his death.
35. S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to -1956 (1962). The question is not the
value of the human life but rather the damages sustained by the beneficiaries.
Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E2d 640 (1969).
36. Accord, Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967).
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of authority in this area. 8 At least two jurisdictions, however,
have reacted more favorably to the plaintiff's despair. In
In re City of New York (Seward Park Slum Clearance Proj-
ect)%O the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
said:
[A]n award in condemnation may also be made for
property, albeit readily removable without damage
to the freehold, if such property were used for busi-
ness purposes and would lose substantially all its
value after severance.
40
Michigan recognizes three general classifications of fixtures:
those actually or constructively annexed to the realty; those
adapted or applied to the particular use or purpose of the
realty; and those intended to become a permanent accession
to the freehold.41  Thus, in Colton v. Michigan lafayette
Building Co.42 the court said that, when such items as repair
parts to elevators, entrance mats, clocks, mirrors, etc., were
purchased by the owner, the intention was to consider such
articles as fixtures and improvements. And, in the case of
In re Slum Clearance, City of Detroit,43 under the concept of
constructive annexation the court concluded that a liquid was
a fixture for which the owner must be compensated.
The dissenting opinion4 ' in Smith regarded the plaintiff's
loss as "special damages" for which he should have been com-
pensated by law.45 Although the "special damages" provision
has not been applied to personal property, the dissent reasoned:
Special damages should include any damages or de-
crease in actual value in the remainder of the land-
owner's property, whether real or personal, which are
the direct and proximate consequence of the acqui-
sition of the right of way.
46
38. The court relied on Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 141,
113 S.E.2d 263 (1960), which dealt only with the recovery of removal and
breakage expenses. See also 27 Am. JuL 2D Eminent Domain § 293 (1966);
Annot., 90 A.L.R. 159 (1934) (both cited by the court).
39. 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S2d 802 (1960).
40. Id. at 500, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
41. Morris v. Alexander, 208 Mich. 387, 175 N.W. 264 (1919).
42. 267 Mich. 122, 255 N.W. 433 (1934).
43. 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W2d 195 (1952).
44. 172 S.E.2d 827, 829 (S.C. 1970) (dissenting opinion). The dissent was
by Justice Bussey with Justice Lewis concurring.
45. S. C. CODE Axx. § 33-135 (1962) provides:
In assessing compensation and damages for rights of way, only the
actual value of the land to be taken therefor and any special dam-
ages resulting therefrom shall be considered (emphasis added).
46. 172 S.E.2d at 830 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 92
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South Carolina State Highway Department v. Wilson47 was
a condemnation case involving the distinction between the
exercise of the state's police power, for which no compensa-
tion is required, and the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, for which just compensation is required.4 8  The trial
resulted in a verdict in favor of the condemnees for a total of
$30,200.00. In determining the award, the jury was allowed
to consider diminution in the value of the remaining property
resulting from the construction of a median which cut off
access to an adjacent highway.
On appeal the highway department maintained that the
construction of the median was a valid exercise of the state's
police power and that damages resulting from such construc-
tion were thus not compensable. 49 The court, disagreeing,
stated:
While the construction of a median, with nothing
more, may very well be an exercise of the police
power with no resulting compensable damage to an
abutting property owner, in the instant case the pro-
posed median is only an incidental part of the over-
all Department plans and contemplated construction.
It logically follows ... that any damage attributa-
ble to the planned median is an incidental result of
the exercise of the power of eminent domain .... 50
11. BREACH OF WAmAN
In Hyd7ick v. MehlmRvn's Inc."1 the plaintiff, purchaser
of a stereo, brought an action for breach of express warranty
against the retail dealer and the manufacturer. The trial
resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $595.00, the
actual purchase price. Upon the defendants' motion the trial
judge ordered that the machine be returned to the defen-
dants, such return properly being required in an action for
rescission. The supreme court, reversing, treated the plaintiff's
47. 175 S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 1970).
48. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956);
Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.F_.2d 683 (1955).
49. The court, recognizing authority to this effect, cited Barnes v. North
Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 257 N.C. 507, 126 S.E2d 732 (1962).
50. 175 S.E.2d 391, 396 (S.C. 1970).
51. 172 S.E.2d 824 (S.C. 1970). This case was commenced prior to the
effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code; therefore, the Code was not
applicable. The reader should, however, refer to S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 102-313
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cause of action as one for damages instead of rescission. There-
fore, the plaintiff was entitled to the property and to the
difference between its value in a defective condition and its
value if it had been as warranted. The fact that the verdict
was equal to the price paid was found to be of no consequence.
(The court stated that the defendants should have moved for
a new trial nisi on the ground of an excessive verdict if they
felt that the machine had some value.) The plaintiff's com-
plaint in effect tendered the machine to the defendants in
accordance with an action for rescission. The court, however,
looked to the entire complaint, the answers, and the instruc-
tions to the jury in determining the nature of the action.
The court also based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff
had not brought his action within a reasonable time after
paying the purchase price and discovering the defect and that
he was not able to return the machine in substantially the
same condition as he received it, both actions being prerequi-
site to an action for rescission.
IV. CONVERSION
In Long v. Gibbs Auto Wrecking Co.53 the plaintiff brought
an action for conversion against the defendant Boatwright,
operator of an automobile wrecker service, and the defendant
Gibbs, who operated a salvage company. The plaintiffs 1960
Ford Falcon station wagon was involved in a collision and
was subsequently stored at Boatwright's place of business.
Thereafter, the car was removed by Gibbs under a mistaken
belief that it was the car upon which he had made a successful
salvage bid. 4 Upon discovering the mistake, Boatwright, to-
gether with the plaintiff, made repeated efforts to regain
possession of the car; however, Gibbs, with knowledge of the
mistake, sold the car to a third person and refused to make an
accounting to the plaintiff. The trial resulted in a verdict for
the plaintiff against Gibbs for $1,885.00, actual damages, and
$2,615.00, punitive damages. 5 On appeal Gibbs maintained
52. Ebner v. Haverty Furniture Co., 128 S.C. 151, 122 S.E. 578 (1924).
53. 253 S.C. 370, 171 S.E.2d 155 (1969).
54. Prior to the accident Gibbs received an invitation to bid on a 1960 two-
door Falcon also stored on Boatwright's premises. Gibbs alleged that his
agent had relied on a statement made by one of Boatwright's employees to the
effect that the plaintiff's car was the only Falcon on the premises.
55. Boatwright, on a cross-action, also received a verdict against Gibbs
for $500.00 for actual damages, including loss of good will. This portion of
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that there was insufficient evidence to support the amount
awarded for actual damages and that punitive damages were
not appropriate.
The supreme court affirmed both awards. In regard to
actual damages the court followed the general rule established
in Mims v. Bennett 56 that the measure of damages for the
conversion of personal property is the value of the property
with interest thereon from the date of the conversion to the
date of the trial.57 The value of the automobile after the col-
lision was determined by figuring the initial cost of the auto-
mobile, minus depreciation, minus the cost of repairs.
The court also found ample evidence to support the verdict
for punitive damages. Gibbs' initial act of acquiring posses-
sion of the car was the result of an honest mistake, for which
Boatwright's employee was partly responsible. However, when
Gibbs sold the car with knowledge of the mistake, there was
obviously a conscious indifference to or reckless disregard for
the plaintiff's rights, which justified the award of punitive
damages.58
V. FRAim AND DEcoIT
Unlike torts involving direct injuries for which the plaintiff
is normally entitled to at least nominal damages without
proving actual damages, the measure of damages for fraud
is the actual pecuniary loss sustained. 59 In Daniels v. CoZe-
man6 it was alleged that the defendant fraudulently acquired
possession of a note and mortgage on certain land owned by
the plaintiff. The supreme court, reversing the lower court's
judgment for the plaintiff, found that the plaintiff had suf-
fered no pecuniary loss since the instruments had not been
hypothecated, passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser,
or acted upon by the defendant. The court thus rejected the
lower court's finding that damage was inherent in a promis-
56. 160 S.C. 39, 158 S.E. 124 (1931). See also Young v. Corbitt Motor
Truck Co., 148 S.C. 511, 146 S.E. 534 (1929); Carter v. DuPre, 18 S.C. 179
(1882).
57. This rule is generally followed by a majority of jurisdictions; see
Annot., 36 A.L.R.2D 377 (1954). There are, however, numerous variations
in the length of time for which interest is recoverable; see 18 Amx. Jum 2D
Conversion § 100 (1965).
58. See discussion of punitive damages in Section I-B, of the text.
59. Fudge v. Physicians Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1954); Thomas
v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886 (1941); 37 Am. Ju. 2D
Fraud and Deceit §§ 283, 346 (1968).




Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH C&RoLiNA LAw REviEw
sory note obtained by fraudulent representations.6 In ad-
dition, the court refused to recognize the plaintiff's expenses
for telephone calls and automobile trips, incurred as a result
of the litigation, as damages in a legal sense. The court re-
garded such expenses only as an inevitable inconvenience. 62
ROBERT W. HEELONG
61. The court; however, recognized the general rule that fraud could be
set up as a defense without proving actual damages; the court cited 37 C.J.S.
Fraud § 103 (1943).
62. Accord, Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148
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